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ABSTRACT
529 saving plans and Coverdell Educational Savings Accounts are marketed as attractive vehicles
for college savings. The main finding of this paper is that college savings plans can actually harm
some families. The joint treatment by the income tax code and financial aid system of college
savings creates tax rates that exceed 100 percent for those families on the margin of receiving
additional financial aid. Since even families with incomes above $100,000 receive need-based aid,
the impact of these very high taxes is quite broad. I find that an aid-marginal family with funds in
a Coverdell is worse off than if it did not save at all. Simulations show that $1,000 of pretax income
placed in a Coverdell for a newborn and left to accumulate until college will face income and aid
taxes that consume all of the principal, all of the earnings and an additional several hundred dollars.
This perverse outcome is the product of poor coordination between the income tax code and the
financial aid system.
Susan M. Dynarski








In the past few years, a new breed of tax-advantaged savings vehicle has emerged.  The federal 
Coverdell Education Savings Account (ESA) allows annual, after-tax deposits of up to $2,000 a year, 
with asset earnings untaxed so long as withdrawals are used for educational expenses. At the state level, 
nearly every state offers a tax-advantaged 529 savings plan. These accounts allow participants to make 
annual, after-tax deposits of up to $11,000 a year per child, comparable to the annual ceilings on the 
401(k).
1 The tax treatment is like that of the ESA: earnings are untaxed by the federal government, and by 
almost every state, when the funds are used for postsecondary education. In about half the states, deposits 
are exempt from state taxation, further increasing the income tax advantages of the 529. 
Politicians and financial advisors aggressively market 529 saving plans and the ESA as attractive 
vehicles for college savings. For many families, the favorable tax treatment of these savings vehicles does 
make them more attractive than other methods of saving for college. However, as I show in this paper, 
some families are worse off saving in an ESA than they would be in an alternative savings vehicle, such 
as an IRA or even a non-tax-advantaged account. For families on the margin of getting more financial aid, 
holding funds in an education savings account will result in substantial decreases in aid eligibility. In the 
case of the ESA, more than a dollar in aid is lost for each dollar held in the account, more than undoing its 
tax incentive for saving and in fact leaving a family worse off than if it had not saved at all.  
One might dismiss the results of the paper as irrelevant by observing that the poor get aid but do 
not save, and the rich save but do not get aid. This common wisdom is wrong. As I show in the next 
section, a substantial proportion of families with incomes above $70,000, and even $100,000, receive 
need-based aid, in the form of both grants and loans. Upper-income students at expensive, four-year 
private colleges often qualify for need-based grant aid from their schools, while even those at less-
                                                      
1 Each parent can deposit $11,000 per child in a given year without triggering a gift tax. A two-parent 
family with three children could therefore move $66,000 per year into a tax-advantaged 529 account. 
Grandparents can also make deposits up to these limits, further expanding the amount of assets that can be 
shielded from taxation. A five-year averaging option allows a participant to contribute $55,000 in a single 
year without triggering a gift tax.   2
expensive four-year public colleges often qualify for subsidized, need-based federal loans. These families 
are therefore subject to the aid policies I describe in the paper. Of course, such families also save, and so 
have assets that are affected by the intersection of tax policy and aid policy described in this paper.  
That there is a tension between policies intended to increase saving and distribute aid according 
to need is unsurprising. The intent of the 529 and ESA is to increase saving by increasing after-tax 
returns. The intent of the need-based aid system is to give less aid to those with higher assets. These two 
sets of policies inevitably work at cross-purposes, because the aid system taxes away part of the increase 
in assets and asset returns that the savings incentives create.
2 This tension between targeting funds to 
those who are most needy and discouraging desirable behaviors is an inherent characteristic of all means-
tested programs. For example, the old welfare system had an earned income test: welfare benefits were 
reduced proportionally for each dollar earned. This acted as a tax on labor supply and theoretically 
discouraged work effort by welfare recipients. Similarly, the need-based aid system taxes increases in 
income and assets, thereby potentially discouraging saving. 
Unless assets and asset income are completely disregarded in the distribution of need-based aid, 
the aid determination process inevitably reduces asset returns and perhaps saving rates. The conclusion of 
this paper is that the tension between targeting aid and discouraging saving can be managed well or 
poorly. For example, I find that that the aid system assesses different assets at very different rates, with 
the drop in aid associated with a dollar in assets ranging from 50 cents to nearly two dollars. This 
variation in asset treatment has a cost, because it distorts decisions about the composition of savings. 
There is no concomitant benefit, however, because these wildly varying policies do not improve the 
targeting of aid toward needy students. If anything, such arbitrary policy variation undermines the goals 
of need-based aid, in that families with identical financial positions receive very different levels of aid, 
depending on whether they are savvy enough to steer their savings toward the right vehicles. 
                                                      
2 The aid tax was first discussed by Edlin (1993) and Feldstein (1995).   3
It now appears that the Department of Education is moving to improve the treatment of the ESA 
documented in this paper. In early November, 2003, the department posted revisions to the online version 
of the Student Financial Aid Handbook, its reference manual of aid rules. These revisions indicate 
that, in the future, the ESA will be given the treatment currently applied to the 529 savings plans. This 
treatment will eliminate the so-called aid tax of over 100 percent that is currently applied to the ESA. 
It is not clear when this new policy will become effective. Given how the department collects 
asset data from applicants, a necessary step in implementing the new policy is revision of the Free 
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). The FAFSA does not collect separate data on each type of 
asset; if it did, the department could change the formula that calculates aid eligibility without altering the 
FAFSA. Rather, the 2003-2004 FAFSA, which has not been revised, instructs families to add ESA 
balances to other miscellaneous student assets, while 529 balances are added to other parental assets. 
Parental and student assets are then run separately through the aid formula, with one dollar in student 
assets leading to a reduction in aid of more than one dollar over the course of a college career.  Note that 
all student assets are subject to this treatment; changing the treatment of the ESA will still leave other 
student assets subject to the very high taxes that are the subject of this paper. The discussion in Section 6 
speaks to this point. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I show that families quite high in the income 
distribution are affected by aid policy. In Section 3, I provide background on the tax-advantaged college 
savings plans. In Section 4, I calculate returns on various savings vehicles net of income taxes. In Section 
5, I explain the aid determination process and calculate returns that accounts for both income taxes and 
the reductions in aid caused by holding savings in various vehicles. Section 6 discusses the results and 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Who Is Affected by Aid Policy? 
What kind of family is affected by the aid system and its treatment of assets? Given the 
historically high level of tuition prices, relatively well-off families qualify for need-based aid, and so are   4
affected by the aid rules. This is particularly true if the student attends a private college, or if a family has 
multiple students in college at the same time.
3 As this section will show, families all along the income 
distribution are affected by the need-based aid system and its treatment of assets and asset returns.  
For two kinds of families, however, the aid system’s treatment of assets is irrelevant. The first 
type of family is extremely needy (as defined by the need-based aid system) and receives the maximum 
aid allowed.
 4 For this family, a marginal decrease in assets does not increase its aid, nor does a marginal 
increase in their assets decrease its aid. Since there is no link between assets and aid for this family, its net 
asset returns are unaffected by the aid system. The second type of family is at the other end of the 
spectrum: this family is very well off (again, as defined by the need-based aid system) and receives no 
aid. Again, marginal changes in assets will not affect this family’s aid eligibility.  For any family that is 
not at one of these two extremes of need, asset returns are affected by the rules discussed in this paper.  
2.1 Who Gets Aid? 
Families all along the income distribution get financial aid. Table 1 shows the probability that a 
student with a given family income will receive need-based aid, and the average amount of aid received 
among aid recipients. These data are for non-foreign, full-time, dependent undergraduates attending a 
single college in academic year 1999-2000 and are taken from the 2000 National Postsecondary Aid 
Survey (NPSAS). I show results separately for four categories of need-based aid: 1) all types, including 
grants, loans and work-study 2) federal Pell Grants only 3) need-based grants provided by colleges and 4) 
subsidized federal loans. 
                                                      
3 A family that has multiple children in college at a given point in time is eligible for more need-based aid 
than if those children attended college in sequence. 
4 Total aid is capped by a student’s actual schooling costs, which includes tuition and fees plus an 
allowance for items such as food, rent, and other living expenses.   5
Low-income families are most likely to receive aid, and get the largest aid packages.
5 Among 
students with family incomes below $40,000, 85 percent receive need-based aid, with their total aid 
packages averaging $6,859. However, middle- and even upper-income families are quite likely to receive 
substantial amounts of aid. Of students from families with incomes of $40,000 to $70,000, 62 percent 
receive need-based aid in the form of grants, loans or work-study, with the aid of recipients averaging 
$5,937. Moving up the income distribution, we see that 37 percent of students from families with incomes 
of $70,000 to $100,000 receive need-based aid averaging $5,371. Even in the highest income group, 22 
percent of students receive some form of need-based aid, averaging $4,975.  
The composition of this need-based aid varies considerably across the income groups. Pell Grant 
distribution is highly progressive. While 68 percent of students from families with income below $40,000 
receive a Pell Grant, only nine percent of students from families with incomes of $40,000 to $70,000 
receive a Pell, and no students in higher income categories.  While the Pell is heavily concentrated among 
low-income students, the story is quite different for other forms of need-based aid. Colleges and 
universities, especially the more-expensive private schools, distribute their own need-based scholarships. 
The more expensive the school, the more likely that a student of a given income level will qualify for 
need-based aid from that school. Among students with family income below $40,000, 26 percent receive 
need-based grants from their schools, with the grant of recipients averaging $4,074. In the next-higher 
income category, the share receiving a need-based grant drops barely, to 24 percent, while the average 
grant received rises to $5,060.  This reflects the tendency of these higher-income families to send their 
children to expensive schools. Even among families with incomes above $100,000, 12 percent receive 
need-based grants from their schools averaging $4,617 per grant.
6  
                                                      
5 Note that the average amount of need-based aid does not drop very rapidly with income. This is because 
higher-income students are more likely to attend expensive private institutions, and need is a function of 
both ability to pay and actual schooling costs.  
6 Most schools follow the federal formulas described in this paper in distributing their own need-based 
grant. Eighty-seven percent of four-year public schools and 57 percent of four-year private schools use 
the federal formula in distributing their own need-based grants (see National Association of Student 
Financial Aid Administrators and the College Board, 2002).   6
Many middle-and upper-income students also qualify for need-based, subsidized federal loans. 
While loans are obviously less valuable than grants, the need-based Perkins and Stafford loans have very 
attractive terms, with all interest paid while the child is in school and a low rate of interest paid thereafter. 
The subsidy value of a need-based Stafford loan is currently about thirty cents on the dollar.
7 In the 
$40,000 to $70,000 income range, 49 percent of students receive one of these federal loans, with annual 
borrowing averaging $3,419, not very different from the borrowing patterns in the lowest income group 
(52 percent borrowing, with loans averaging $3,835). Even in the highest income category the figures are 
12 percent and $3,518, respectively. 
 
2.2 Who is on the Margin of Getting More Aid? 
Many of these families who receive need-based aid are on the margin of getting more aid – that 
is, an increase (decrease) in their financial resources decreases (increases) the amount of aid for which 
they are eligible. So too are those families who currently get no aid at all but would if their financial 
resources, as defined by the aid system, were to decrease. We can get a sense of how many students are 
on the aid margin by examining the population of current students, and in particular those who apply for 
financial aid. Note that who applies for aid is almost certainly influenced by individuals’ expectations 
about whether they will qualify for aid and how much they might receive. For example, an upper-income 
family with substantial funds in an ESA might not apply for aid under the current policy regime, but 
would if the aid system treated ESAs differently. By using data from those students who apply for aid to 
estimate the share of all students who are on the margin of aid I underestimate the share of the student 
                                                      
7 See Dynarski (2002). The bulk of the subsidy arises from the government paying the interest on the loan 
while the student is in school. The subsidy value on the Stafford is at a historical low, since market 
interest rates are quite low.  As market interest rates rise, so too does the subsidy value. The subsidy value 
rises especially rapidly when market rates exceed the statutory rate cap of 8.25 percent, as above this rate 
the government assumes all interest rate risk.    7
population that would be affected by a change in the aid formula, since I do not account for such 
endogenous changes in the extensive aid margin.
8   
Describing who is on the aid margin requires some understanding of how the need-based aid 
system defines need. As I will describe in greater detail later in the paper, need is determined by 
comparing a student’s projected schooling costs with the amount that the aid formula determines that her 
family can afford to pay toward college. This latter amount is referred to as the expected family 
contribution (EFC). Need is defined as schooling costs minus the EFC.  
Two types of students are on the aid margin: 1) those receiving no aid who would receive aid if 
their financial situation changed marginally (these students have non-positive need) and 2) those 
receiving some aid who would get more or less aid if their financial situation changed marginally (these 
students have positive need). I treat these two cases in turn. 
A student with non-positive need is not eligible for need-based aid, because the aid formula 
calculates that he and his family can handle the full cost of college. Those with very negative need 
(EFC>>schooling cost) are far from the aid margin, because the aid formula indicates that they can 
contribute an amount well above schooling costs; such families are not on the aid margin. But for those 
whose need is relatively small and negative, marginal decreases in their financial resources push them 
over the margin into aid eligibility.  
At the bottom of Table 1, I show the share of students in each income category whose need lies 
between 0 and -$5,000. For these students, changing the formula so that their expected family 
contribution drops by $5,000 or less pushes them over the margin into receiving aid. To get a sense of the 
magnitude of this change in EFC, note that a high school senior whose family has $15,000 of college 
savings in a Coverdell ESA or UTMA (Uniform Transfer to Minors Act) account has a freshman-year 
                                                      
8 Note that, in the calculations that follow, when a student does not have EFC information, as is the case 
for anyone who has not applied for aid, I have assumed that she is not on the margin of getting aid.    8
EFC about $5,000 higher than a senior whose family has no college savings.
9  The lowest-income 
families (less than $40,000) are always eligible for some form of need-based aid, so none of them are on 
this aid margin. However, six percent of students from families in the $40,000 to $70,000 income range, 
and 14 percent of those in the $70,000 to $100,000 income range, would be pushed into aid eligibility by 
a decrease in their EFC of $5,000 or less. In the highest income group, eight percent are on this aid 
margin.
10 
Another type of family is getting some need-based aid but would get more if their EFC dropped. 
These families have positive need, but they are not so needy that changes in their financial situation 
cannot increase or decrease their aid package. I define these families as those whose EFCs are sufficiently 
far from zero (at least $5,000) that they will see substantial changes in need if their financial resources (as 
defined by the aid system) alter. For such families, dollar decreases in need translate into dollar increases 
in aid. For example, their need can increase by at least $5,000 without bumping up against the ceiling of 
the student’s total schooling costs.
11 Again, few low-income students are on this aid margin – just four 
percent. However, about forty percent of students in the $40,000 to $100,000 income group have room for 
their need to grow by at least $5,000. Nineteen percent of students in the top income group fall on this aid 
margin.  
As the bottom row of Table 1 shows, a substantial share of families fall on one of these two aid 
margins. Roughly half of students from families with income between $40,000 and $100,000 are on the 
margin of getting more aid, as are a quarter of those from families with income above $100,000.  The 
                                                      
9 As I will show later in the paper, the aid eligibility of subsequent years of college is also negatively 
affected by this ESA account, so the ultimate impact of ESA and UTMA holdings on aid is substantially 
larger than that described in this sentence. 
10 Note that the share of students on this margin is likely to be underestimated using data on aid 
applicants, as discussed above. 
11 This assumes that all need is met by some combination of loans, grants, and work-study provided by 
government and schools.   9
interaction of aid policy and tax policy described in this paper therefore affects a large number of 
families. 
 
3. Income Tax Incentives for College Saving 
3.1 Legislative History 
In 1997, the Education IRA was established. The Education IRA was structured much like the 
then-new Roth IRA. In both types of vehicles, after-tax dollars grow tax-free.  Earnings are never taxed if 
Education IRA withdrawals are used for postsecondary expenses or if Roth funds are withdrawn after age 
59 ½. Annual contributions to the Education IRA were capped at $500 per child until 2001, when the 
contribution limit was raised to $2,000. The same year, eligible educational expenses were expanded to 
include primary and secondary education, and the name of the Education IRA was changed to Coverdell 
Education Savings Account (ESA).  
While the ESA is a product of federal legislation, the 529 savings plans are innovations of the 
states. The 529 savings plans have their roots in prepaid tuition plans, the first of which was introduced 
by Michigan in 1986. Those who purchased shares in Michigan’s plan were guaranteed that their 
investment would cover the cost of a certain number of semesters at Michigan schools. Essentially, 
Michigan created a savings plan whose rate of return was linked to tuition costs at the state’s public 
postsecondary schools, thereby allowing parents to insure against the risk of rising tuition prices.
12 
Michigan exempted investment returns in its prepaid plan from state taxes, and the state argued to the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that returns should also be exempted from federal taxes. The IRS 
disagreed, but Michigan went forward with the plan and sued the IRS for a refund of taxes paid, winning 
its case in 1994. While the Michigan case was wending through the courts, several other states introduced 
their own prepaid tuition plans. 
                                                      
12 A key drawback of the prepaid plans is that the tuition guarantee is only for in-state schools.  Funds can 
be used at out-of-state schools, but the implied rate of return on funds used in this way is quite low.   10
In 1997, Congress codified in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 529 the federal tax treatment 
of the tuition plans, which was to tax earnings in these accounts only at withdrawal. IRC section 529 also 
contains language that recognized a variant on the prepaid plans that had been introduced by a handful of 
states: the tax-advantaged college savings plan. Like the Education IRA, these new savings plans allowed 
after-tax investments to grow free of federal and state taxes; however, withdrawals used for 
postsecondary costs were exempt only from state taxation.  
With the passage of tax reform in 2001, the federal tax on withdrawals from 529 savings plans 
was eliminated.
13 Every state except Washington now has a 529 savings plan, as does the District of 
Columbia. The growth of the 529 savings plans has far outstripped that of the prepaid plans, likely 
because of their greater fungibility and potentially higher returns.
14  In this paper, I focus on the 529 
savings plans. 
 
3.2 Eligibility for and Tax Advantages of the 529 and ESA 
The tax treatments of the ESA and 529 are quite similar: after-tax dollars put into savings and 
earnings are not taxed as they accrue, nor are they taxed at withdrawal if the withdrawal is used for 
educational expenses.
15 However, there are some key differences between the two savings vehicles.  
First, there is an income limit on participation in the ESA. Joint-filer households with incomes 
above $220,000 and single-filer households with incomes above $110,000 cannot contribute to an ESA; 
                                                      
13 This federal tax treatment of the 529 savings plans sunsets in 2010. The present analysis assumes that 
the provision will be extended indefinitely. 
14 The bull market of the 1990s made the tuition plans appear stodgy to investors accustomed to double-
digit returns. Also, the plans substantially constrain the college choices of beneficiaries, who can use the 
funds at out-of-state schools only at unattractive terms. 
15 As discussed below, some states exempt contributions to the 529 from state taxable income, thereby 
increasing the tax advantages.   11
eligibility begins to phase out at $190,000 and $95,000, respectively. There is no income limit on 
contributions to a 529 savings plan.
16 
A second distinguishing characteristic of the 529 is that its contribution limits are much higher 
than the limit on the ESA. Each account owner (a parent or grandparent, for example) can put $11,000 in 
after-tax income per beneficiary, per year, into a 529.
17 A two-parent family with three children can put 
$66,000 a year into 529 savings plans for their children, but just $6,000 into ESAs. Each state has a 
lifetime limit on the account balance that can be reached in an account held in a given beneficiary’s name. 
When the account reaches this limit, no additional contributions can be made. The limit averages 
$241,000, and it ranges from $182,000 in Louisiana to $305,000 in South Dakota.
18  
Third, while families can invest their ESAs as they wish, they are constrained in their ability to 
allocate assets in a 529. Each state determines the investment options open to investors in its plan and, by 
federal law, assets can be reallocated by the investor only once a year. Until recently, most 529 savings 
plans provided only a single investment option, an age-based portfolio that grew less aggressive as the 
child neared college age.  Most plans now offer several investment options. 
Finally, the 529s are creatures of state government, with each state sponsoring its own plan. There 
is therefore heterogeneity across the states in 529 characteristics, including portfolio choice, tax treatment, 
and net returns. Each state contracts with a mutual fund company to run its plan; chooses the mutual 
funds that will be available to investors; decides upon the treatment of deposits and earnings for the 
purposes of state taxation; and negotiates fees that will be paid by the investor to the state and fund 
company. Individuals are free to participate in any state’s plan. Many of the states encourage their 
residents to invest in the local plan by allowing them to deduct contributions to its 529 savings plan from 
                                                      
16 In some states, the exclusion of contributions from state taxable income phases out as income rises. The 
exclusion of earnings from taxable income is not linked to income in any state. 
17 $55,000 per account owner, per year, can be deposited in a single year for a beneficiary if no deposits 
are made for the next four years. 
18 See Cerulli Associates, 2003.     12
state taxable income. Some states also tax withdrawals from other states’ 529 plans, further encouraging 
investors to choose their home state’s plan.  
There is considerable cross-state variation in fees charged on the 529 accounts. 529 fees also 
appear to be somewhat higher, on average, than fees on ESAs or retail mutual funds. For the purposes of 
this paper, I ignore this source of variation in net returns across states and savings vehicles. By assuming 
that pretax returns on the various savings vehicles are identical, we can focus on variation in returns 
driven by the income tax code and the aid system. In ongoing work, I explicitly focus on sources of cross-
state heterogeneity in 529 returns and its impact on savings decisions.  
 
4. Calculation of After-Tax Returns on the ESA, 529 and Alternative Savings Vehicles 
In this section, I calculate returns, net of the income tax, on the 529 and ESA, in absolute terms 
and relative to other vehicles. I first show variation in net returns across vehicles for a single household 
type, with household income of $100,000 and two dependent children. Since the benefits of tax-




For the purposes of assigning tax rates, I consider a household that consists of a married couple, 
filing jointly, with two dependent children. All earned income is assumed to come from one earner.
19 The 
children are assumed to have no income other than that produced by any college savings held in their 
name. The marginal federal and state tax rates on earned income, capital gains and interest for this 
household, as well as for the other income groups I will be analyzing, are shown in Table 2. The state tax 
                                                      
19 Some assumption about the distribution of earned income within the household must be made in order 
to assign FICA rates. For each earner, the FICA rate is 7.65 percent up to $87,000 and 1.45 percent 
thereafter.   13
rates in Table 2 are the average of the states’ 2002 marginal tax rates for each income group, as calculated 
by the National Bureau of Economic Research’s TAXSIM program.
20   
Table 2 shows, and the paper’s calculations use, federal tax rates effective as of the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003. Some of these rates are scheduled to revert to 
pre-2003 rates in a few years. Since it is difficult to forecast which, if any, of these provisions will be 
allowed to sunset, in this paper I calculate the effect of making the current provisions permanent. 
For each savings vehicle, I calculate the return to $1,000 of pretax income placed in an account at 
the time of a child’s birth. A family saving for college will likely start with a portfolio heavily weighted 
toward stocks, moving toward a more conservative mix as college nears. Every state’s 529 savings plan 
offers an age-based portfolio that follows this pattern. I use a portfolio mix typical of state 529s in 
calculating returns; this portfolio is shown in Table 3. I assume an identical portfolio mix for the other 
savings vehicles, so that any the variation in returns across the vehicles will be induced by variation in 
their treatment by the income tax and aid systems.  
Stocks are assumed to earn a nominal rate of return of nine percent and bonds a rate of four 
percent. To simplify the analysis, I assume that all stock returns take the form of long-term capital gains. 
Capital gains are realized when the funds are withdrawn from the account in order to pay for college; 
these withdrawals begin at the end of the account’s eighteenth year.
21 After any relevant taxes on asset 
earnings are paid, earnings are reinvested.  
In about half the states, deposits to the 529 are excluded from state taxable income. I calculate 
returns for 529s both with and without this upfront deduction. I also calculate returns for a non-tax-
advantaged mutual fund account in the name of the parent, a Uniform Transfer to Minors Act (UTMA) 
account in the name of the student, and a Traditional IRA.  Table 4 summarizes the income tax treatment 
                                                      
20 The average is taken over the states that have an income tax. I use effective marginal state tax rates 
calculated by TAXSIM, rather than the bracket rates. The effective marginal rates account for the 
interaction of state and federal taxes as well as the phase-out of various credits and deductions. 
21 The family withdraws 1/nth of the remaining balance each year, with n representing the number of 
years remaining until college completion. For the calculations in the paper, I assume four years of college.   14
of these savings vehicles. For all vehicles, I assume that all capital gains realizations are put off until the 
account is drawn down, and that no dividends are earned. Therefore, the only relevant taxes on the inside 
buildup are those on bond interest.
22  Note that the IRAs can be used for higher education expenses 
without the 10 percent penalty usually assessed on withdrawals before retirement age. However, the 
earnings portion of such early withdrawals from a Roth is subject to taxation as ordinary income. As a 
result, the Roth is not an advantageous vehicle for college savings if its use requires early withdrawal. 
 
4.2 Calculation of Returns Net of Income Taxes - Example 
I first calculate the nominal returns for a family with household income of $100,000, using the 
assumptions laid out above. The return for a non-tax-advantaged mutual fund account, held in the name of 
the parent, forms the benchmark used to gauge the financial benefits of the tax-advantaged vehicles.  
After paying Social Security and Medicare taxes (FICA), as well as federal and state income 
taxes, on $1,000 of pretax income, this household has $673 to deposit. The family uses the portfolio 
allocation shown in Table 3, putting 90 percent of the funds into stocks and the balance into bonds. 
Interest on the bonds is taxed as ordinary income; the interest net of taxes is reinvested in the account. 
After eighteen years, the account will have grown to $1,135, with 55 percent of the account’s value 
consisting of unrealized capital gains. At the end of year eighteen, one-quarter of the account balance is 
withdrawn to pay for college.  Capital gains taxes are paid on the portion of this withdrawal that 
represents unrealized capital gains. After four years of withdrawals, the account is empty. Taking into 
account income and payroll taxes, as well as taxes on interest and capital gains, a family following the 
investment path just described nets $1,113 on its $1,000 in pretax saving, as shown in the first bar in 
Figure 1 and in Table 5.   
The tax-advantaged vehicles, including the 529 and ESA, increase returns by reducing or 
eliminating the taxes assessed before the initial deposit, during the inside buildup, and/or at withdrawal. 
                                                      
22 I assume that current tax law will persist despite the scheduled sunset of the exclusion of 529 earnings 
from federal taxable income.   15
The return for each of these vehicles is shown in Figure 1. The second column of Table 5 shows the 
returns on assets held in these vehicles relative to returns for a non-advantaged account in the name of the 
parent. Below, I briefly discuss the tax advantages conferred by each of these vehicles.  
The UTMA account shifts assets into the child’s name and, thereby, the child’s lower tax 
bracket.
23  The initial pretax savings are taxed at the parent’s rate, and so $673 is deposited into the 
UTMA account, as was true for the parental account discussed above. For a family with taxable income 
of $100,000, these tax advantages translate into a substantially higher return on the UTMA account than 
on a parental account. This family yields $1,453 in an UTMA account, nearly one-third more than in a 
parental account.  
A 529 savings account confers even greater tax advantages than the UTMA, because the taxes on 
the inside buildup and withdrawals are not just reduced, they are eliminated. In a state that does not allow 
families to deduct 529 deposits from taxable income, $1,000 of pretax income translates into the same 
$673 deposit that was placed in the parental account and UTMA account. Because no taxes are levied on 
the inside buildup, by the time the child enters college the family has a slightly higher balance in a 529 
than it would in a parental account or UTMA account ($2,314 as compared to $2,135 and $2,277, 
respectively). The relative advantage of the 529 grows as the family begins to draw down the funds and is 
exempted from any taxes on the resulting capital gains realizations. Accounting for these taxes, the family 
nets a $1,634 return on its $1,000 in pretax savings, 47 percent more than in a parental account and 12 
percent more than with an UTMA. The ESA confers the same tax advantages as the 529 without an 
upfront deduction and therefore yields the same return.
24   
                                                      
23 In an UTMA, annual asset earnings up to $750 are untaxed. For a child younger than 14, the next $750 
is taxed at the child’s rate and the remaining earnings are taxed at the parents’ rate. For children 14 and 
over, all earnings over $750 are taxed at the child’s rate. Note that the tax advantages of the UTMA drop 
as asset holdings (and earnings) grow, since an ever-smaller share of earnings are taxed at a zero rate. 
24 A key difference, however, is that much larger amounts can be deposited in a 529 than can be deposited 
in an ESA.    16
The return on these two college savings vehicles is also identical to that on the Traditional IRA. 
The Traditional IRA is the mirror image of the college savings accounts, because there are no upfront 
taxes on the $1,000 deposit and no taxes on the inside buildup, but withdrawals are taxed as ordinary 
income. Note that there is no penalty for early withdrawal (before age 59½) from the Traditional IRA if 
the funds are used for higher education expenses. The Traditional IRA therefore yields the same return as 
the ESA and 529, producing a return 47 percent greater than a non-advantaged parental account.  
The option with the highest return is a 529 in a state that allows deposits to be deducted from 
state taxable income. For a given $1,000 in pretax income, more can be deposited into this account than is 
true for a non-deductible 529 or ESA. With the typical state tax rate on earned income of 5.95 percent, the 
initial deposit is $718 rather than the $673. Going forward, the tax treatment is the same as for a standard 
529 or ESA. The 529 with an upfront deduction yields a return of $1,811, or 63 percent more than a non-
advantaged account in the parent’s name. 
As these calculations make clear, the education savings accounts provide new and substantial tax 
advantages. The 529 with the upfront reduction offers a higher return than any existing investment option. 
Further, the 529 and ESA, while yielding the same after-tax return as the Traditional IRA, substantially 
expand the assets that can be shielded from taxation. Finally, since the 529 has no eligibility 
requirements, it provides the first opportunity for tax-advantaged saving for those families ineligible for 
the IRA or ESA due to their incomes or their access to a pension program at work.  
 
4.3 Calculation of Returns Net of Income Taxes - All Income Groups 
In this section, I examine the advantages of the education savings accounts for a range of 
household incomes, ranging from the lowest federal tax bracket (household income of $35,000) to the 
highest (household income of over $335,000). The groups and their associated state and federal tax rates 
on earned income, capital gains, and interest are shown in Table 2.  
I first show how returns vary by income in our benchmark, a non-advantaged account held in the 
name of the parent. In Figure 2, and Table 5, we see that the lowest-income household has the highest   17
absolute returns. This is due to this group’s relatively low tax rates on two types of income. First, this 
group’s lower marginal tax rates on earned income produce a larger deposit for a given $1,000 of pre-tax 
income: they start with $773 in principal, compared to $572 for the highest-income family. This 
difference in the upfront taxation of income accounts for most of the variation across income groups in 
net returns. Second, the lowest-income household faces the lowest marginal tax rates on capital gains and 
interest. As a result of these two aspects of the tax code, the highest-income household earns an after-tax 
return of $728 on its pretax savings of $1,000, while the lowest-income household earns 2.4 times as 
much, or $1,735.  
By eliminating some forms of taxation, the tax-advantaged vehicles flatten this income gradient 
in after-tax returns. Figures 3 and 4 shows the after-tax return on the ESA and 529 for each income group. 
Figure 4 shows the returns in dollar terms, while Figure 3 scales the returns relative to the return in the 
non-advantaged account for that income group. Note that since their returns for the investment scenario 
laid out earlier are identical, I have collapsed the ESA, 529 without an upfront deduction and the 
Traditional IRA into one category. It should be recalled, however, that the contribution limits are far 
higher on the 529 than the ESA or IRA, making the 529 particularly advantageous to those who save 
above the ESA or IRA limits, or to those participating in a retirement plan at work and above the 
associated IRA income limits. Also, note that the top two income groups do not qualify for the ESA but 
do qualify for the 529. 
The largest increases in returns accrue to the highest income group, both in dollar terms (Figure 
4) and relative terms (Figure 3). For those in the top federal tax bracket, the 529 with an upfront 
deduction delivers a net return almost twice as high as that on a non-advantaged account. The 529 without 
an upfront deduction and the ESA net an after-tax return 70 percent higher than funds held in a non-
advantaged account. For those in the lowest bracket, the proportional increases are much lower: the return 
on a 529 with an upfront deduction is 26 percent. The corresponding figure is 17 percent for the ESA and 
529 with no upfront deduction. Note that the UTMA is of almost no benefit for this lowest-income 
household, since the child and parent are in the same low tax bracket.    18
These calculations make clear that both the relative and absolute advantages of the education 
savings accounts rise steeply with income. At the bottom of the income distribution, where marginal tax 
rates are the lowest, the new accounts offer after-tax returns 17 to 26 percent higher than the return on a 
non-advantaged account. For an initial pretax investment of $1,000, this translates into an additional 
return of $291 to $453. At the top of the income distribution, the new accounts offer after-tax returns 70 
to 91 percent higher than that on a non-advantaged account. For an initial pretax investment of $1,000, 
this translates into an additional return of $511 to $663.  
 
5. The Treatment of Assets by the Financial Aid System 
This section turns to the financial aid system I first discuss in general terms the aspects of aid 
determination that affect net returns to savings. Next, I calculate the impact of the aid system’s treatment 
of assets on returns to various savings vehicles.  
 
5.1 Overview of the Financial Aid Determination Process  
The federal government distributes need-based aid according to a formula called the Federal 
Methodology, which I describe in this section.
25 Most schools use the same formula when distributing 
their own need-based aid. Eighty-seven percent of four-year public schools, and 57 percent of four-year 
private schools, use the Federal Methodology to distribute need-based institutional grants.
26 The aid 
determination process I describe here is that used for dependent students in academic year 2002-2003.
27  
                                                      
25 The aid determination process is described in detail by the Department of Education in annual releases 
of The Student Financial Aid Handbook. The 2002-2003 version used in this paper was downloaded from 
http://ifap.ed.gov/IFAPWebApp/currentSFAHandbooksPag.jsp on October 17, 2003. 
26 See National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators and the College Board (2002). 
27 In the past, students gamed their dependency status, since for an independent student family income is 
not counted in the need determination process, Today, almost all college-age students are considered 
dependents, as rule changes have made it much more difficult for young people to declare themselves 
independent.   19
Families applying for aid fill out the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), which 
collects detailed information on family income, assets and expenses. A new FAFSA, with current data, 
must be filled out previous to every academic year for which a student wants aid. Financial data from the 
FAFSA is put through an algorithm that calculates the expected contribution of the family and of the 
student toward schooling costs. If the sum of the expected contributions from the family and student is 
less than anticipated schooling costs, the student is eligible for aid. In the calculation of the expected 
contribution savings are taxed, because both assets and asset income are considered resources for paying 
for college.  
The resources of the family and the student are calculated separately, and assessed at differing 
rates in the determination of aid. I start with the family’s expected contribution. In the calculation of the 
family’s contribution, an  algorithm sums parental income from all sources. Asset income, in the form of 
dividends, interest, and capital gains, is included.
28 In particular, the earnings portion of withdrawal from 
some asset accounts is counted as income by the aid formula. After summing income, the aid algorithm 
subtracts allowable expenses, including taxes, an allowance based on family size, tuition paid for primary 
and secondary school, and unusually high medical costs.   
To this net income figure is added twelve percent of certain family assets.
29  From the perspective 
of the aid system, assets fall into three categories. A first class of assets, notably home equity, pensions, 
and other retirement vehicles, is completely sheltered from consideration by the aid formula. These assets 
are not considered available for college expenses. A second class of assets, including 529 savings 
accounts and ESAs, is considered fully available for college expenses. The first dollar of these assets is 
assessed in the determination of aid. A final class consists of any assets that do not fall into these first two 
categories. These assets are partially sheltered from consideration by an asset protection allowance. Each 
family is allowed a certain level of savings, based on the age of the oldest parent; the assumption is that 
                                                      
28 I discuss below the types of assets for which this source of income is counted and not counted. 
29 If a family is not required to file a 1040 and has an adjusted gross income (AGI) below $50,000 then no 
assets are added at this point.   20
older parents need a higher level of savings for their approaching retirement. Below this allowance, assets 
in this class are assumed to be unavailable for schooling costs. The highest allowance is $70,000; for a 
family in which the oldest parent is 50, the allowance is $44,000. Above the allowance, twelve percent of 
assets is added to the net income figure.    
The resulting weighted sum of income, expenses and assets is the family’s adjusted available 
income (AAI). A progressive schedule, with rates ranging from 22 percent to 47 percent, is applied to 
AAI to determine the expected family contribution (EFC).
30 The schedule is quite steep: an AAI of 
$11,000 is marginally assessed at 22 percent, while the schedule tops out at an AAI of $24,000, which is 
marginally assessed at 47 percent. In the calculations below, I assume that families are at the top of this 
schedule.  
The expected contribution of the student is calculated analogously to the process just described, 
with fewer protections for income and assets. All student income above $1,750 is assumed to be available 
for college and is assessed at a rate of 50 percent. There is no asset protection allowance for students. For 
each year of college, students are expected to contribute 35 percent of their assets. 
 
5.2 The Treatment of Assets and Asset Income in the Aid Determination Process 
Assets returns are affected twice in the process just described, since both asset balances and asset 
income are considered available for college expenses. I will first describe the treatment of an asset 
balance. Consider an entering freshman whose parents have $45,000 in financial assets that are not held in 
retirement accounts or college savings plans. These assets fall into the third category described above, and 
so are partially sheltered by the asset protection allowance. Assuming the older parent is 50, $44,000 is 
protected from consideration by the aid formula and $1,000 is subject to assessment. Twelve percent of 
the $1,000 is added to adjusted available income, which is then assessed at 47 percent, and so 5.64 (=0.12 
                                                      
30 Families that are not required to file a 1040 and whose incomes are below $13,000 are automatically 
assigned an EFC of zero.   21
x 0.47) percent of the $1,000 is considered available for the first year of college. Freshman-year aid is 
reduced by $56.40 as a result of this aspect of the aid formula. 
If the child goes on for another year of college, and applies again for aid, sophomore year aid is 
again reduced by 5.64 percent of the remaining asset balance. As a result, the total impact of this $1,000 
asset on aid received throughout college is a function of the annual assessment on the asset balance ( a t , 
5.64 percent in this case) and the number of years spent in college. If a family draws down an equal share 
of the initial asset balance for each year of college (and, for simplicity, we assume no asset earnings once 
the child enters college) we can summarize the reduction in aid received over the college career as a result 











Here, t indexes each year of college for which aid is requested, T is the total number years of college for 
which aid is requested; a indexes different types of assets. Say the high school senior we are considering 
ends up spending four years in college, drawing down equal increments of the asset per year for expenses. 
For this family, each dollar of assets held as of the senior year leads to a reduction in aid over the four 
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or 14.1 percent. Note that this is not the full impact of the asset on aid, as we have not allowed the asset to 
grow while the child is in college, which produces income that goes into the aid formula, nor have we 
considered that some portion of the withdrawals may consist of earnings, which again produces income 
that goes into the aid formula. I will consider both of these issues below and in the main calculations of 
the paper.  
I have just described the aid system’s treatment of a parental asset. Some savings are considered 
assets of the child in the calculation of aid eligibility, which changes the annual assessment rate from 5.64 
to 35 percent. The second column of Table 6 shows the annual assessment on asset balances for the   22
savings vehicles we have been considering throughout the paper. Balances in a 529 savings plan are 
treated as an asset of the parent in the determination of the aid tax on asset balances. Balances in 
retirement vehicles are ignored by the aid formula. An ESA is considered by the aid system to be owned 
by the potential student, as is an UTMA or any other asset in the child’s name.
31 For such assets, the 
relevant annual assessment on asset balances is 35 percent, rather than 5.64 percent. Further, the first 
dollar of such assets is assessed at this rate, as there is no asset protection allowance for the student. Over 
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As the table and these calculations make clear, the aid tax on asset balances varies widely across savings 
vehicles.  
I next describe the aid system’s treatment of asset earnings.  Like all other sources of income, 
asset income is considered a financial resource that a family can apply toward college costs, and so 
increases in asset income lead to decreases in aid. Asset income is considered only if it is realized during 
a year whose income is considered in the determination of aid. Asset income is assessed with a one-year 
lag, since it is based on income reported on the previous year’s 1040.  Freshman-year aid, for example, is 
based on the FAFSA filed when the student was a high school senior. This FAFSA contains tax return 
                                                      
31 Department of Education documents for the 2003-2004 school year clearly state that the ESA is to be 
treated as an asset of the child, which is assessed at the 35 percent rate: “The Education IRA is counted as 
an asset of the beneficiary” and “Education IRAs have been appropriately renamed education savings 
accounts; they are considered an investment asset for the student beneficiary (pp. AVG-20 and AVG-19, 
respectively, in The Student Financial Aid Handbook 2003-2004. This document can be accessed at 
http://ifap.ed.gov/sfahandbooks/attachments/0304AVGMaster.pdf) This same information is contained in 
the dozens of financial advising documents, news articles, and financial aid resources for parents, schools 
and aid professionals that I have consulted. It is also contained in the instructions for completing the 
online FAFSA.  
As of November, 2003, it appears that the Department of Education is moving to improve the treatment of 
the ESA documented in this chapter. The department has now posted revisions to the online version of 
The Student Financial Aid Handbook, its reference manual of aid rules. These revisions indicate that, in 
the future, the ESA will be given the treatment currently applied to the 529 savings plans. This will 
eliminate the aid tax of over 100 percent that is currently applied to the ESA. See further discussion of 
implementation of this policy shift in the introduction to this paper.   23
data on asset income for the calendar year that spans the spring of the junior year and fall of the senior 
year of high school. Any earnings received during that period count as income in the determination of aid 
for freshman year. These earnings might take the form of interest, dividends or capital gains realizations 
stemming from the sale of stock or liquidation of a mutual fund.  
Note that in any account that has been building value for 18 years a substantial portion of the 
balance consists of unrealized gains. As the account is drawn down for college, these earnings are realized 
and assessed by the aid formula. In a non-advantaged account, given the investment scenario assumed 
throughout the paper, unrealized gains represent about 55 percent of account value. When withdrawals are 
made to pay for college 55 percent of each withdrawal is treated as income. 
Any income taxes paid in a given year offset the income taxed by the aid formula. For example, 
interest earned in a non-advantaged account is taxed by the state and federal governments. Interest adds to 
adjusted available income, and taxes paid on the interest subtract from it. The aid system therefore 
assesses asset income net of any income taxes paid on that income. 
The last two columns of Table 6 show the assessment rate on asset earnings for the different 
savings vehicles. I show separately the treatment of earnings accruals and of withdrawals.  
For the 529 and ESA, earnings are ignored by the aid system as they accrue; these earnings do not 
appear on the FAFSA. The earnings portion of withdrawals from the 529 is also ignored by the aid 
system. However, the earnings portion of withdrawals from the ESA are assessed at 50 percent.
32 For the 
Traditional IRA, earnings are ignored by the aid system as they accrue and the entirety of any withdrawal 
is treated as income and is assessed at the parents’ rate of 47 percent. However, any income taxes paid on 
these withdrawals reduce the amount of income that goes into the aid formula.
33  
                                                      
32 See p. AVG-17 of US Department of Education (2003).   
33 Personal communication with Anthony Jones, US Department of Education. Also see Chapter 6 of The 
Student Financial Aid Handbook 2003-2004, which contains the worksheets that detail the treatment 
various assets and income.   24
 
5.3 Returns Net of Income Taxes and Aid Reductions 
Table 7 shows how reductions in aid affect after-tax returns for various savings vehicles. The first 
column shows the return on a given savings vehicle for a household that is unaffected by aid policy; these 
are the returns we have seen in earlier tables. As discussed earlier, asset returns are unaffected by aid 
policy for two types of families. The first type is extremely needy (with very low financial resources 
and/or very high schooling costs) and receiving the maximum aid allowed.
 34 The second type of family is 
not at all needy (with very high financial resources and/or very low schooling costs) and receiving zero 
aid. For neither family does a marginal change in assets affect aid. 
The second column of Table 7 shows returns net of reductions in financial aid induced by asset 
holdings. I assume, as I have throughout the paper, that the account funds are drawn down over the four 
years of college. These results are not shown for the top two tax brackets, in which I assume household 
income is sufficiently high (above $150,000) that the child is beyond the margin of eligibility of financial 
aid at even the most expensive institutions. Columns (3) and (4) express the loss in aid as a percent of the 
asset balance at the start of college and as a percent of the after-tax return, respectively. 
The impact on returns is enormous, especially for the UTMA and ESA, for which returns are 
negative once losses in aid are considered,. Each of these assets is considered by the aid system to belong 
to the child. As a result, the annual assessment on asset balances held in either of these vehicles is 35 
percent, rather than the 5.64 percent applied to the other savings vehicles. When we consider only income 
taxes, an aid-marginal family with taxable income of $50,000 that puts $1,000 pretax in an ESA nets a 
return of $1,808. This return is 22 percent higher than if the funds were invested in a non-advantaged 
account (see Table 4). But once we consider losses of need-based aid, the financial advantage of the ESA 
disappears. The final return on the $1,000 pretax investment, net of income and aid taxes, is -$1,194. This 
family loses all principal and all earnings, plus an additional $194, to income taxes and foregone aid. The 
                                                      
34 As already noted, total aid is capped by a student’s actual schooling costs, which includes tuition and 
fees plus an allowance for items such as food, rent and other living expenses.   25
aid lost due to owning assets in the ESA, expressed as a percentage of the return net of income tax, ranges 
from 160 percent for the family with $35,000 of income to 172 percent for the family with $100,000 of 
income. A similar story holds for the UTMA, with the reduction in returns ranging from 178 to 194 
percent. 
Since this is such an extraordinary result, I will lay out in detail the losses in aid associated with 
holding funds in an ESA. Table 8 shows the calculation in detail, for the ESA, for a 529 without an 
upfront deduction and for an UTMA. As an example, I examine a family with $100,000 in income.
35 In 
January of year 18, when the child is a high school senior, this family files a financial aid form. At this 
time the ESA account, which has been gaining value since it was established at year 0 with an after-tax 
contribution of $673, contains $2,314; this balance is shown in Column (1) of Table 8. Thirty-five percent 
of this balance, or $810, is considered available for college costs; this is shown in Column (2). At the end 
of the year, when the child is a freshman in college, the family draws down $609, one-quarter of the end-
of-year balance [Column (4)]. Seventy-one percent of this amount ($432) consists of earnings, which is 
considered income of the child in the calculation of aid and assessed at 50 percent. Aid is therefore 
reduced by $216 due to this withdrawal. 
The remaining rows repeat these calculations for the three subsequent years, until the account is 
emptied. Asset balances are assessed four times, once for each FAFSA that is filed. Withdrawals are 
assessed just three times; this is because income is recorded on the FAFSA with a one-year lag, and so the 
final, senior-year withdrawal does not appear on a filed FAFSA. The total reduction in aid is $2,816, 
while the balance at the start of year 18 was $2,314.  The ratio of these two numbers is the 122 percent 
shown in Table 7.  
The 529 savings plans are not as hard hit by the aid tax, as the aid system considers this asset to 
belong to the parent rather than to the child. The aid tax on net-of-income-tax returns for the 529 is 57 to 
63 percent, lower than that on a non-advantaged account in the name of the parent (63 percent to 81 
                                                      
35 Family income does not affect the aid process depicted in Table 8, but it is necessary to choose an 
income tax bracket to pin down the dollar amounts shown therein.    26
percent). Once we consider aid taxes, the 529, with or without an upfront deduction, nets higher returns 
than the non-advantaged account, the UTMA or the ESA. In the case of the non-advantaged account, the 
529 performs better because its inside buildup is not taxed by the aid system. In the case of the UTMA 




The intent of the savings incentives is to increase saving by increasing net returns. The intent of 
the financial aid system is to give less aid to those with higher income and assets. These two sets of 
policies inevitably work at cross-purposes, as the financial aid system attempts to tax away any increase 
in assets and income that the savings incentives create. Unless assets and asset income are completely 
disregarded, asset returns for aid-marginal families are reduced by the aid determination process. Given 
this constraint, we can make the aid tax as non-arbitrary as possible. Here, I discuss the results of the 
paper’s analysis in the context of this goal. 
 
6.1 Asset “Taxes” Greater Than 100 Percent 
It is difficult to infer any reasonable policy goal that is consistent with the aid system’s current treatment 
of the Coverdell, the UTMA, and all assets held in the name of the student. Families that put funds in 
these vehicles lose all their assets to income taxes and aid reductions; that is, these vehicles face income 
taxes and “aid taxes” that sum to well over 100 percent. The paper’s simulations show that a middle-
income family that puts $1,000 into a Coverdell loses all of the principal and earnings, plus an additional 
$194, to income and aid taxes. A family that puts funds into the name of the student in an UTMA is even 
worse off, losing principal and earnings plus an additional $391. Any asset held in the name of the child 
faces similar treatment. 
Fully taxing away principal and earnings—a tax of 100 percent – is consistent with a very strict, 
narrow formulation of need: at the time of college attendance, it puts a saving family in the same position   27
vis-à-vis the aid system as a non-saving family.
36 However, taxing away more than principal and earnings 
is certainly not consistent with this strict formulation of need, as it places the saving family in a worse-off 
position than the non-saving family, by thousands of dollars if they save at the rate recommended by 
financial counselors.  
 
6.2 Sharply Differing Tax Rates on Parents’ and Students’ Assets 
The differing treatment of assets held by the parent and the student has a very large impact on aid 
received and net returns, as is shown in Figure 5. This operates counter to the aid system’s goal of treating 
equally families with equal resources, as two families with the same asset levels face vastly divergent tax 
rates depending on whose name is on the account. A middle-income family (income of $50,000) that puts 
funds in the child’s name in an UTMA account yields a small income tax advantage – a nine percent 
increase in the lifetime return (not annualized return), as shown in Table 4. For a family that deposits 
$1,000 of pretax income in an account and leaves it to accrue for 18 years, this translates into a savings of 
$133. However, the associated loss in aid more than erases this small gain from gaming the income tax 
system. Once we consider both the income tax and losses in aid, this family loses $1,881 by having the 
funds in an UTMA account rather than in the parents’ name [netting a return of -$1,391 versus $490, see 
Column 2 of Table 7]. Further, they end up with far less than they would have had they not saved at all, 
having lost their principal, their earnings and an additional $391. Further, the first dollar of funds held in 
the child’s name result in aid reductions, while assets held in the parent’s name are protected by an asset 
allowance. As a result, the average aid tax rate on the parents’ assets is well below that on children’s 
assets. 
 
                                                      
36 The saving family has forgone consumption to save, and so it is worse off in a lifetime sense than if it 
had not saved at all when principal and earnings are fully taxed away. Edlin (1993) discusses this and 
other aspects of the equity of the aid tax.   28
6.3 Sharply Differing Tax Rates on Different Savings Vehicles 
As Table 7 makes clear, the impact of aid policy on asset returns varies wildly, depending on the savings 
vehicle. A dollar in assets held by the family of a high school senior produces, over a four-year college 
career, a reduction in need-based aid of 15 cents if the funds are held in a 529 savings plan, 26 to 39 cents 
if the funds are held in an IRA, about forty cents if the funds are held in a typical mutual fund account in 
the parent’s name, $1.22 if they are held in a Coverdell ESA, and $1.24 if they are held in an UTMA 
account. We can express these aid reductions relative to after-tax returns on these various savings 
vehicles. The reduction in aid caused by holding funds in a given vehicle ranges from 19 percent of after-
tax returns for the 529 to 200 percent for the UTMA. 
As discussed above, in the context of asset ownership by parents and children, such wildly-
varying treatment of assets does not advance the goals of the need-based aid system. It induces an 
efficiency loss, in that it encourages shifting of assets toward those vehicles that are treated preferentially 
by the aid system. And it induces a loss in equity, in that it imposes significant losses on those who do not 
know how to game the system. This leads to a loss of horizontal equity, in that the aid system treats 
unequally those who have the same asset levels but have made differing strategic choices about where to 
put the funds. 
 
6.4 Policy Alternatives 
Two key points emerge from this discussion. First, some assets are treated extremely punitively 
by the aid system, resulting in those who save losing more than one dollar in aid for each dollar they hold 
in assets. A second and distinct point is that the treatment of assets is highly inconsistent. I have already 
explained the efficiency and equity losses induced by these aspects of the aid system. Here I lay out and 
critique several policy options that address these two points.  
There are two main sources of the variable treatment of assets by the aid system: the differential 
treatment of parents’ and children’s assets and the differential treatment of different asset types – e.g., 
retirement accounts, home equity, college savings plans, and non-advantaged accounts. The differential   29
treatment of parents’ and children’s assets accounts for most of the variance in the treatment of assets; for 
example, because the Coverdell is defined as an asset of the child, it faces an annual assessment rate on 
asset balances of 35 percent, rather than the 5.64 percent imposed on the 529 savings plans, which are 
defined as an asset of the parent. Were the Coverdell instead defined as an asset of the parent a dollar held 
in a Coverdell would lead to a reduction in aid of fifteen cents, the same as the 529 savings plan, rather 
than $1.22. The fact that the first dollar of children’s assets is assessed while many parental assets are 
protected by an allowance that goes as high as $70,000 also contributes to the divergence in the treatment 
of parents’ and children’s assets.
37 
Pooling parents’ and children’s assets in aid determination will therefore go far in reducing the 
variability in the treatment of assets. All children’s assets, and not just those of the student applicant, 
would be included in this pool. Applying what is currently the treatment of parental assets to children’s 
assets is the simplest solution, but this approach would obviously lead to a higher level of aid 
expenditures, since children’s assets would be assessed at a much lower rate. A revenue-neutral 
alternative would be a new assessment rate on the pooled assets that is the asset-weighted average of the 
current assessment rates. Note that this pooling of assets would bring children’s assets under what is 
currently the parents’ asset protection allowance.  
The second issue is how different types of assets are treated. Currently, the value of retirement 
assets and home equity are completely excluded from aid determination.
38 All other assets contribute to  
the net worth considered available for college costs.  An alternative is to pool all assets – regular 
accounts, Coverdells, 529s, UTMAs, retirement assets, home equity – and tax them uniformly in the aid 
determination process. Under such a system, the aid tax rate on assets would be the same across savings 
vehicles. Unifying assets in this way would reduce the deadweight loss caused by families shifting assets 
to avoid the aid tax. It would also eliminate several sources of horizontal inequity. For example, 
                                                      
37 Since the paper’s calculations use marginal tax rates rather than average rates they ignore this aspect of 
the divergence in the treatment of parent’s and children’s assets. 
38 After-tax withdrawals from retirement funds are treated as available income, however.   30
homeowners in areas with high real estate values (the East and West coasts) have greater opportunity to 
shield assets from the aid system than do renters or those in areas with lower real estate values (the 
middle of the country). Similarly, those who work in jobs that provide access to a 401(k) have a greater 
ability to shield assets than do other workers.  
If other aspects of the aid determination process were unchanged, the main effect of pooling all 
types of assets would be to decrease aid, since it would add retirement assets and home equity to the net 
worth considered available for paying for college. To maintain the current level of aid spending, the 
assessment rate on all assets could be reduced below its current maximum of 5.64 percent. Alternatively, 
the asset protection allowances could be increased so that the total net worth assessed by the aid system 
remains unchanged.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the income tax code’s most recent experimentation with education policy, in the 
form of the Coverdell Education Savings Account and the 529 savings plans. Tax incentives for college 
saving were designed to increase savings by increasing after-tax returns. From the narrow perspective of 
the income tax code, they have succeeded in increasing after-tax returns. But if we broaden our 
perspective to include the interaction of the new tax incentives with existing educational policy – in the 
form of the financial aid system – these policies fail. Families that save for college are potentially subject 
to taxation not only by federal and state taxing authorities but also by the federal, state and college 
financial aid systems. As I have shown, the aid tax on savings can extend well up the income distribution, 
as fairly well-off families can qualify for aid at expensive private institutions.   
For families caught in the cross-fire between aid policy and tax policy, the impact on the bottom 
line is not pretty. A family that heeds advice to save for college in one of the new college savings vehicles 
can find itself far worse off than if it had simply placed funds in a non-advantaged account in the parents’ 
name. Further, those who put funds in a Coverdell can find themselves worse off than if they had not   31
saved at all. These perverse outcomes indicate that greater attention to the interaction of aid and taxes is 
required if the tax code is to succeed as an instrument for education policy. 
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Received 85% 62% 37% 22%
Mean if > 0 $6,859 $5,937 $5,371 $4,975
Received 68% 9% 0% 0%
Mean if > 0 $2,259 $1,056 - -
Received 26% 24% 18% 12%
Mean if > 0 $4,074 $5,060 $4,793 $4,617
Received 52% 49% 28% 12%
Mean if > 0 $3,835 $3,491 $3,322 $3,518
0% 6% 14% 8%
4% 39% 39% 19%
4% 45% 53% 27%
Subsidized Federal Loan,
Perkins or Subsidized Stafford
Pell Grant
Eligible for Need-Based Aid, Room for Need to 
Increase by $5,000 or more if EFC drops
Total Share on Aid Margin
Ineligible for Need-Based Aid, but
Will Qualify if Expected Family Contribution 





Dependent Full-Time Undergraduates, Academic Year 1999-2000
Household Income
Need-Based Aid Receipt, by Income
Note: Data are from NPSAS 2000.Federal State FICA Federal State Federal State Federal State
$35,000 10% 5.08% 7.65% 5% 4.41% 10% 5.08% 5% 5.08%
$50,000 15% 5.65% 7.65% 5% 4.83% 15% 5.65% 5% 5.65%
$100,000 25% 6.29% 1.45% 15% 5.22% 25% 6.29% 15% 6.29%
$150,000 28% 6.43% 1.45% 15% 5.61% 28% 6.43% 15% 6.43%
$200,000 33% 6.38% 1.45% 15% 5.48% 33% 6.38% 15% 6.38%
$335,000+ 35% 6.40% 1.45% 15% 5.56% 35% 6.40% 15% 6.40%
Dividends
Table 2
Marginal Tax Rates Used in Calculations
Household 
Income
Earned Income Capital Gains Interest Income
Notes: Federal rates are 2003 bracket rates. State rates are average of effective 2002 marginal rates calculated from NBER TAXSIM. State averages taken 




Stock Share 90% 85% 74% 68% 59% 58% 45% 42% 25% 9%
Bond Share 10% 15% 26% 32% 41% 42% 55% 58% 75% 4%
Age-Based Portfolio Used in Return Calculations
Table 3
Note: Values reflect typical age-based 529 portfolio. Investment Option
Income Limit 
married, filing jointly
Taxes Paid on Income,
  pre-deposit
Taxed Paid on Inside Build-up Taxes Paid at Withdrawal
Non-Advantaged 
Account, Parent
Federal and state, plus FICA Federal and state




No income limit if no work-
related retirement plan.
FICA
Federal and state on entire 
withdrawal
529
Federal and state, FICA.
No state taxes if 529 with 
deduction
Coverdell $220,000  Federal and state, FICA
UTMA Federal and state, FICA
Federal and state
First $750 untaxed
Child 14+: earnings >$750 at child's rate
Child <14: next $750 at child's rate & 
>$1500 at parent's rate
Federal and state on 
realized capital gains, 
child's rate
Table 4
Tax Treatment of College Saving Alternatives












































After-Tax Return to College Savings Alternatives
Notes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 2, with stock returns of 9% and bond returns of 4%. One-time investment of $1,000 
of pretax income with all earnings reinvested. Funds drawn down over the final  four years of investment horizon.Investment Option
Annual Assessment on 
Asset Balance
Annual Assessment on 
Earnings Net of Income Tax
Assessment of Withdrawals
Non-Advantaged Account, Parent 5.64% 47% 47% of realized earnings net of income tax
Traditional IRA 0% 0% 47% of withdrawal net of income tax
529 5.64% 0% None
Coverdell 35% 0% 50% of realized earnings
UTMA 35% 50% 50% of realized earnings net of income tax
Table 6





Net of Aid Loss
(3)
Return Net of Aid 




Aid Loss As % of 
Asset Balance at 
Start of College
(5)
Aid Loss As % of 
After-Tax Return
Non-Advantaged Account, Parent
$35K $1,735 $635 1.00 43% 63%
$50K $1,485 $490 1.00 43% 67%
$100K $1,113 $267 1.00 40% 76%
$150K $987 $193 1.00 39% 80%
$200K $803 - - -
$335K+ $728 - - -
UTMA
$35K $1,824 -$1,422 -2.24 124% 178%
$50K $1,618 -$1,391 -2.84 124% 186%
$100K $1,453 -$1,366 -5.12 124% 194%
$150K $1,338 -$1,349 -6.98 124% 201%
$200K $1,157 - - -
$335K+ $1,084 - - -
529 Plan (Deduction)
$35K $2,188 $1,772 2.79 15% 19%
$50K $1,976 $1,587 3.24 15% 20%
$100K $1,811 $1,444 5.41 15% 20%
$150K $1,683 $1,333 6.90 15% 21%
$200K $1,475 - - -
$335K+ $1,391 - - -
529 Plan (No Deduction)
$35K $2,026 $1,631 2.57 15% 19%
$50K $1,808 $1,441 2.94 15% 20%
$100K $1,634 $1,290 4.84 15% 21%
$150K $1,511 $1,183 6.13 15% 22%
$200K $1,317 - - -
$335K+ $1,238 - - -
ESA
$35K $2,026 -$1,209 -1.90 122% 160%
$50K $1,808 -$1,194 -2.44 122% 166%
$100K $1,634 -$1,182 -4.43 122% 172%
$150K $1,511 -$1,174 -6.08 122% 178%
$200K $1,317 - - -
$335K+ $1,238 - - -
Traditional IRA
$35K $2,026 $987 1.55 33% 51%
$50K $1,808 $844 1.72 31% 53%
$100K $1,634 $730 2.74 27% 55%
$150K $1,511 $649 3.36 26% 57%
$200K $1,317 - - -
$335K+ $1,238 - - -
Table 7
After-Tax Return to College Savings Alternatives, Net of Financial Aid Losses Balance, 
Start of Year 





End of Year 
 Withdrawal, 
End of Year 
 Loss of Aid due to 
Asset Income,





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 18 2,314 $           810 $                        2,435 $          609 $              216 $                        
Year 19 1,826 $           639 $                        1,922 $          641 $              227 $                        
Year 20 1,282 $           449 $                        1,349 $          674 $              239 $                        
Year 21 674 $              236 $                        710 $             710 $             
TOTAL 2,134 $                    682 $                         2,816 $   
122%
 Balance, 
Start of Year 





End of Year 
 Withdrawal, 
End of Year 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 18 2,314 $           130 $                        2,435 $          609 $              - $                         
Year 19 1,826 $           103 $                        1,922 $          641 $              - $                         
Year 20 1,282 $           72 $                          1,349 $          674 $              - $                         
Year 21 674 $              38 $                          710 $             710 $             
TOTAL 343 $                        - $                          343 $      
15%
 Balance, 
Start of Year 





End of Year 
 Withdrawal, 
End of Year 
 Loss of Aid due to 
Asset Income,





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 18 2,277 $           797 $                        2,392 $          598 $              226 $                        
Year 19 1,794 $           628 $                        1,884 $          628 $              238 $                        
Year 20 1,256 $           440 $                        1,320 $          660 $              241 $                        
Year 21 660 $              231 $                        693 $             693 $             
TOTAL 2,096 $                    705 $                         2,801 $   
123%
Note: 68-71% of withdrawals consist of unrealized earnings. Family has household income of $100,000.
Table 8: Detailed Aid Calculations
Loss in Aid for Family Holding Various Assets
Coverdell ESA
529, No Upfront Deduction
As Share of Year 18 Starting Balance:
UTMA
As Share of Year 18 Starting Balance:
As Share of Year 18 Starting Balance:Notes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 3, with stock returns of 9% and bond returns of 4%. One-time investment of $1,000 of pretax income with all 
eanrings reinvested. Funds drawn down over the final four years of investment horizon.
Figure 1: 
After-Tax Return to College Savings Options




























nFigure 2:  
After-Tax Return to Non-Advantaged Account Held in Name of Parent





























nNotes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 3, with stock returns of 9% and bond returns of 4%. One-time investment of $1,000 of pretax income with all 
earnings reinvested. Funds drawn down over the final  four years of investment horizon.
Figure 3: 
After-Tax Return to College Saving Options 






























ESA, Traditional IRA or 529 (no deduction)
529 (deduction)Notes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 3, with stock returns of 9% and bond returns of 4%. One-time investment of $1,000 of pretax income with all 
earnings reinvested. Funds drawn down over the final four years of investment horizon.
Figure 4 



























ESA, Traditional IRA or 529 (no deduction)
529 (deduction)Figure 5
Return to College Saving Options, Net of Aid Lost and Income Tax
















































529 Plan (No Deduction)
529 (deduction)